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CASH ME OUTSIDE—AN ALTERNATIVE TO WASTEFUL
MEDICAL SPENDING IN TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS
Christopher Neal Loy, Jr.*
Abstract
The U.S. health care system is an inefficient machine that is burdened
by overconsumption and wasteful spending. The system has long
defaulted into maximizing the quantity of life over quality—a choice
influenced by corporations that stand to profit with every additional
procedure. To stymie health care spending and attempt to restore the true
cost of treatment to patients, this Note proposes an alternative to how
health insurers provide options to terminally ill cancer patients by
offering a partial cash rebate to forgo any life-extending measures. The
patient would be free to leave his or her legacy, the health insurer would
save on expenses, the natural inclination to consume more health care
would be lessened, and the reduction of wasteful medical spending would
help lower the cost of health care.
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INTRODUCTION
The true cost and realities of undergoing aggressive cancer treatment
are often ignored in favor of an intrinsic desire to maximize the patient’s
lifetime, maximizing quantity of life over quality of life in determining
medical treatment. There are many motivations for the propensity to elect
for care—a patient’s fear of death, society’s inclination to maximize the
lives of the dying while discounting the suffering associated with
undergoing chemotherapy and similar measures, and physicians’
reluctance to have frank, honest discussions with patients about the
realities of dying and the true costs and benefits associated with
undergoing aggressive cancer treatment.
To more closely align a terminally ill patient’s wishes with the course
of treatment received, this Note proposes that health insurers give
terminally ill patients a choice. This Note suggests that health insurers
offer a “cash out” provision in health insurance policies that provides a
terminally ill patient an option to receive a cash rebate to forgo end-oflife treatment. The amount of the rebate would be equal to a percentage
of the amount the insurer would pay for the treatment of a similarly
situated patient.
As this Note asserts, not only is a cash-rebate provision like the one
proposed possible, but such a provision should be adopted and utilized
by health insurers. Part I of this Note explores the realities of cancer and
delves into the current political and economic state of the U.S. health care
system. Part II of this Note confronts some of the legal hurdles a cashrebate provision would encounter and distinguishes the provision from
numerous analogies to other medical legal issues. Finally, this Note
concludes with a full endorsement of the provision and suggests that
states adopt such an idea in an effort to restore the cost–benefit balance
and to fully align the patient’s desire with the treatment provided.
I. AN EXPENSIVE EXIT
Cancer kills nearly one in four Americans, second only to heart
disease.1 A 2016 article predicted that in that year alone, approximately
1,685,210 new cases of cancer would be diagnosed and approximately
595,690 people would die of cancer—1,630 people per day.2 The amount
of money the United States spends in combatting cancer is equally as

1. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2016, at 1 (2016),
https://www.cancer.org/content/dam/cancer-org/research/cancer-facts-and-statistics/annualcancer-facts-and-figures/2016/cancer-facts-and-figures-2016.pdf.
2. Id.
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devastating as the sheer loss of human life cancer claims.3 This Part will
delve into the reality of cancer and the economics at play in the health
care market surrounding this problem.
A. What Is Cancer?
The idea of cancer strikes terror into the minds of many; however,
people often misunderstand the condition. Cancer is a term that
collectively refers to diseases that are characterized by a rapid and
uncontrollable reproduction of the body’s cells which spreads to the
surrounding tissue.4 As our cells age, they break down, die, and are
normally replaced by new cells.5 However, biological processes can go
haywire, causing rogue cancer cells to reproduce uncontrollably and form
growths called tumors.6 Cancerous tumors are often malignant7—the
runaway cells can spread and not only invade nearby tissue, but can break
off and travel through the blood to remote parts of the body to form
additional tumors far away from the original location.8 Usually the body’s
immune system destroys rogue cells; however, cancer cells are able to
dodge and even hijack the body’s immune system to keep the system
from destroying cancer cells.9 The spread of the cancerous cells to
additional parts of the body is referred to as metastasis.10 Treatment of
metastatic cancer may only help prolong the lives of some people, since
it focuses on controlling the growth of the cells or relieving symptoms
caused by it rather than curing it.11 Treatment options for cancer can
include radiation, chemotherapy, and targeted therapy, among others.12
The decision to undergo treatment for terminal cancer is a complex

3. See Hagop Kantarjian & S. Vincent Rajkumar, Why Are Cancer Drugs so Expensive in
the United States, and What Are the Solutions?, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 500, 500 (2015) (stating
that the United States spends 18% of its gross domestic product on health care costs versus 5–9%
in European nations).
4. What Is Cancer?, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/aboutcancer/understanding/what-is-cancer (last updated Feb. 9, 2015).
5. Id.
6. Cancers generally form solid tumors; however, cancers of the blood generally do not.
Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (“Although the immune system normally removes damaged or abnormal cells from
the body, some cancer cells are able to ‘hide’ from the immune system.”).
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 1.
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decision that consists of a web of factors, not the least of which is the
impact on family and loved ones.13
B. Cancer Diagnosis and Contributing Factors
While many factors can contribute to the rate of cancer diagnosis,14
individuals with a lower socioeconomic status (SES) experience both a
higher prevalence and more cancer deaths than those with a higher SES.15
In addition to a higher prevalence of cancer, those with a lower SES “are
substantially more likely to be diagnosed with cancer at a later stage when
treatment is more extensive, more costly, and less successful.”16 One
study that examined the rate of colorectal cancer diagnosis found a
striking relationship between SES and the stage at which colorectal
cancer is diagnosed.17 On a broad basis, the study found that individuals
living in the lowest SES areas were 45% more likely to be diagnosed at a
later stage than persons in the highest SES area.18 More specifically, the
study reported that within the poorest SES, Blacks were significantly
more likely (68%) to be diagnosed with a late-stage disease than Whites
(63.1%).19 Additional factors of an individual’s diagnosis and ultimate
outcome are the individual’s “social context,”—housing condition,
neighborhood poverty, and unemployment.20
The relationship between lower SES and high rates of late-stage
diagnosis is difficult to precisely define and explain. A factor that could
contribute to the higher rates could be a lack of access and availability of
early screening detection.21 Another contributing factor could be the
attitudes to the culture of poverty that not only decrease the likelihood of
those individuals utilizing early detection, but also cause a general
unwillingness to seek care for manifesting symptoms.22 Other factors that
can account for a heightened rate of cancer include a higher likelihood of
13. See, e.g., EXTREMIS (f/8 Filmworks 2016) (depicting the stark reality of end-of-life care
and how the decision whether to undergo care encompasses more than merely the effect on the
patient themselves).
14. Jeanne Mandelblatt, The Late-Stage Diagnosis of Colorectal Cancer: Demographic and
Socioeconomic Factors, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1794, 1794–95 (1996) (citing age, race,
socioeconomic status, and insurance status as factors that relate to cancer diagnosis).
15. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 50; see also Mandelblatt, supra note 14, at 1795
(suggesting poverty as the key through which other sociodemographic factors influence how
severe a patient’s cancer has progressed at diagnosis).
16. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 9.
17. See Mandelblatt, supra note 14, at 1795.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1796.
21. See id. at 1795.
22. See id.
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engaging in behaviors that increase risk of cancer, such as workplace
exposures or being overweight.23 Further, the lion’s share of cancer-care
costs occur during the last year of life.24
Treatment for cancer is wide-ranging, depending on a number of
factors like the type and phase of cancer present.25 Treatment could
include surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, immunotherapy, and targeted
therapy, among others.26 Chemotherapy is designed to kill cancer cells
and can be administered orally, by injection, or intravenously.27 As
chemotherapy kills rapidly dividing cancer cells, however, it also slows
the growth of healthy cells or kills them, causing painful side effects.28
Another effective type of cancer treatment is radiotherapy, which
involves administering high doses of radiation to kill cancer cells and
shrink tumors.29 Unsurprisingly, radiotherapy can be very expensive as it
involves complex machines and numerous health care providers.30 For
instance, the external beam radiotherapy involves treatment that lasts up
to six weeks with individual treatments five days a week.31
Chemotherapy and radiation treat many types of cancer effectively;
however, it is not without physical cost in the form of side effects. For
instance, common side effects for chemotherapy include fatigue, pain,
mouth and throat sores, nausea and vomiting, blood disorders like anemia
and leukopenia, hair loss, and various nervous-system effects.32
Accordingly, a patient must consider a horde of factors other than the side
effects when deciding whether to undergo treatment for cancer.

23. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 50.
24. See Angela Mariotto et al., Projections for the Cost of Cancer in the United States:
2010–2020, 103 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 117, 121 (2011).
25. Types of Treatment, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/
treatment/types (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
26. Id.
27. Chemotherapy, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/
chemotherapy (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
28. For instance, chemotherapy can attack cells that line a person’s mouth and intestine
which could cause mouth sores and nausea. Id.
29. Radiation Therapy, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/
treatment/radiation-therapy (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Side Effects of Chemotherapy, CANCER.NET (Aug. 2018), http://www.cancer.net/
navigating-cancer-care/how-cancer-treated/chemotherapy/side-effects-chemotherapy. Leukopenia
is a condition defined by a lack of sufficient white blood cells. Id. Generally, chemotherapy
destroys healthy cells like white blood cells in addition to the cancerous cells. Id. A low white
blood cell level is dangerous because it leads to a higher risk of serious infection. Id. Anemia is
characterized by a lack of sufficient red blood cells in the body and can lead to fatigue, dizziness,
and shortness of breath. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

452

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

C. Market Economics
The U.S. health care market is unique mainly because it is largely a
for-profit industry, unlike the markets in European and other similar,
advanced nations.33 This structure creates interesting and adverse
dynamics within the U.S. market regarding incentives and pricing
structures. Further, the for-profit approach appears to result in
consequences that are at least partially driven by demands for higher
profits and higher heath care costs.34 This misalignment from the supply
side subsequently may lead to an imbalance in favor of profit-seeking
behavior that discounts the lives of the individuals and patients on the
demand side. Compare, for instance, that the health care costs in the
United States account for 18% of the United States’ gross domestic
product, whereas in the European model those costs are only 5% to 9%.35
In a true free market, prices are determined by what the market is willing
to pay for a certain good or service.36 However, the United States’ health
care system is anything but a free market. Patients who are deemed
terminally ill find their “freedom to participate” in medical intervention
substantially diluted because the patient’s choice to become subject to a
sickness is not a voluntary decision. More often than not, a patient’s
decision whether to undergo medical intervention is substantially offset
for a number of reasons, lessening the leverage the “buyer” has in the
market.
While the incentive shift that occurs within the patient–insurer
relationship contributes to the inaccurate cost within the market,
physicians’ active role in determining cancer treatment options can also
play a role.37 In one survey, oncologists required a “survival rate of 2–4
months to justify a hypothetical treatment expense of $70,000.”38 Thus,
presenting a “cost-effectiveness threshold of $300,000 per qualityadjusted life year (QALY)39 [to prescribe] hypothetical treatment,” a
threshold that exceeds most others in health care.40 This implies that
doctors are much more willing to utilize aggressive cancer treatment,
33. Kantarjian & Rajkumar, supra note 3, at 500.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Adam Schickedanz, Of Value: A Discussion of Cost, Communication, and Evidence
to Improve Cancer Care, 15 ONCOLOGIST 73, 75 (2010) (reporting that in one study 88% of
oncologists thought that cost should not impact treatment decisions at all).
38. Id.
39. A quality-adjusted life year (QALY) is a method of evaluating health improvement by
combining the length of life with quality of life to produce a single number used to guide health
care resource allocation decisions. See Milton C. Weinstein et al., QALYs: The Basics, 12 VALUE
IN HEALTH S5, S5 (2009). One QALY equates to one year lived in perfect health. Id.
40. Schickedanz, supra note 37, at 74–75.
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regardless of the high cost, low return. Another study found that the
prescription of overly aggressive radiation treatment that provided little,
if any, benefit was also partially attributable to oncologists’ propensity to
prescribe radiation treatment in the final stages of a patient’s life.41 The
study found that, while patients opted to go ahead with the treatment that
was suggested by their oncologist as a possible ray of hope as their
eminent death approached, that decision could also be attributed to the
difficulty of confronting the switch from fighting the cancer to providing
symptomatic care.42 Rather than suggesting a change of focus, it would
seem easier for oncologists to simply suggest a heroic last-ditch effort at
one more round of chemotherapy regardless of the limited benefit.43
Inefficiencies in over-prescribing end-of-life heroic measures can lead to
a poor utilization of resources which leads to higher costs for limited
benefit that may not even align with the patient’s wishes. Changes to the
health care system (and the health insurance market more specifically)
that more accurately align patient incentives with the true wishes of the
patient should be a top priority for providers, insurers, and lawmakers
interested in improving health care in the United States.44
Cancer is a significant driver of health care costs—the direct medical
costs for cancer in the United States in 2014 were $87.8 billion45 and are
projected to rise46 partially due to more effective targeted treatments
becoming the new standard of care.47 A wide range of factors contribute
to the high cost of providing care—the cost of follow-up care, the cost of
expensive procedures, and the cost of cancer drugs are just a few.
Generally, the cost of cancer can be broken down into direct medical
costs and indirect medical costs.48 Direct medical costs are the costs
associated with care that the patient receives—for instance,
hospitalizations, surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy—and are usually
measured by adding insurance payments along with patient out-of-pocket

41. Craig C. Earle et al., Aggressiveness of Cancer Care Near the End of Life: Is It a
Quality-of-Care Issue?, 26 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3860, 3862 (2008).
42. Id.
43. Id. As an aside, one must also question the incentives oncologists receive from drug
companies and whether that monetary interest is not insignificant. See id.
44. See Schickedanz, supra note 37, at 74.
45. Economic Impact of Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/cancer/
cancer-basics/economic-impact-of-cancer.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2017).
46. See Mariotto et al., supra note 24, at 124 (projecting the cost of providing cancer care
in the United States to be $157.77 billion by 2020).
47. Id.
48. K. Robin Yabroff, Economic Burden of Cancer in the United States: Estimates,
Projections, and Future Research, 20 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 2006,
2007 (2011).
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copayments and deductibles.49 Indirect costs are associated with “time
spent receiving medical care, time lost from work or other usual activities
(morbidity costs), and lost productivity due to premature death (mortality
costs).”50 Thus, the true cost of providing care is impossible to calculate
looking only at direct medical expenditure. Rather, the true cost of cancer
takes a toll on the entire economy, affecting productivity and an
individual’s earnings and employment status.51 Additionally, not only is
the cost associated solely with the individual suffering from the cancer,
but costs are borne by caregivers and families.52
The United States spends more on health care per capita than any other
wealthy nation.53 In 2013, the United States spent 17.1% of its gross
domestic product on health care—nearly 50% more than the next highest
spender globally, France.54 Despite the amount of money poured into the
system, the United States fares far worse in comparison to other similarly
situated nations.55 One study found that 68% of Americans aged 65 and
older had at least two chronic health issues while international
percentages ranged from 33% to 56%.56 Additionally, in 2013 the United
States had the lowest life expectancy (78.8 years) compared to the OECD
median (81.2 years).57 As a result, the high cost of health insurance paired
with the lackluster results causes financial hardship for a number of U.S.
citizens.58 So much so that “[t]he burden of the cost of care is now

49. Id.
50. Id. at 2008.
51. See Gery P. Guy Jr. et al., Economic Burden of Cancer Survivorship Among Adults in
the United States, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3749, 3754 (“The plausible range of aggregate
annual net productivity loss among cancer survivors was $9.6-16.0 billion among those age 1864 years and $8.2-10.6 billion in cancer survivors age ≥ 65 years.”).
52. Yabroff, supra note 48, at 2008, 2012.
53. David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, The Current and Projected Taxpayer
Shares of US Health Costs, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 449, 449 (2016); see also Florence K. Tangka
et al., Cancer Treatment Cost in the United States, 116 CANCER 3477, 3477 (2010) (stating more
specifically, the majority of cancer care cost is incurred in the last few months of life).
54. David Squires & Chloe Anderson, U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective:
Spending, Use of Services, Prices, and Health in 13 Countries, 15 COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 2
(2015).
55. Olga Khazan, U.S. Healthcare: Most Expensive and Worst Performing, ATLANTIC (June
16, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/us-healthcare-most-expensiveand-worst-performing/372828/.
56. Squires & Anderson, supra note 54, at 7.
57. Id.
58. See Amy S. Kelley et al., Out-of-Pocket Spending in the Last Five Years of Life, 28 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 304, 304–09; see also M. Pisu et al., Economic Hardship of Minority and
Non-Minority Cancer Survivors 1 Year After Diagnosis: Another Long-Term Effect of Cancer?,
121 CANCER 1257, 1261 (2015) (“[O]ur findings indicate almost 50% of survivors experienced
economic hardship about 1 year after diagnosis.”).
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considered an additional side effect of cancer and its treatment.”59 A large
portion of the costs that are attributable to financial hardship are not a
result of undergoing the treatments, but rather the high costs that lead to
the inability to afford the cancer drugs after receiving the treatments.60
For instance, one study found that cancer survivors had higher mean
annual expenditures compared to those who were not diagnosed with
cancer.61 Further, “the annual excess economic burden of cancer
survivorship among those recently diagnosed was $16,213 per cancer
survivor age 18–64 years and $16,441 per cancer survivor aged over 65
years.”62 With the growing number of cancer survivors increasing
substantially over time due to advances in treatment, early detection, and
increased life expectancy, the cost of follow-up care becomes an
important factor for patients diagnosed with cancer to consider.63
Another negative consequence of high cost of care manifests itself in
medication nonadherence.64 “It has been estimated that nearly half of
prescription medications for chronic disease are not taken as properly
described.”65 Medication nonadherence accounts for more than $100
billion a year in the form of increased health services utilization, hospital
admission, and adverse drug events associated with nonadherence.66 One
study suggested that “[n]onadherence may have a substantial impact on
the [outcome] of oral regimens for the prevention or treatment of
malignancies.”67 While it may seem like those suffering from cancer
would “have more to lose” and subsequently incentivize them to strictly
adhere to medication regimens, studies have suggested otherwise.68 To
59. See Pisu et al., supra note 58. Some studies have termed the economic burden of
receiving medical care “financial toxicity.” See Julie McNulty & Nandita Khera, Financial
Hardship—an Unwanted Consequence of Cancer Treatment, 10 HEALTH ECON. 205, 206 (2015).
Financial toxicity can lead to treatment nonadherence and lifestyle changes that impact the
patient’s quality of life and affect the treatment’s efficacy. Id.; see also Jennifer L. Malin et al.,
Wrestling with the High Price of Cancer Care: Should We Control Costs by Individuals’ Ability
to Pay or Society’s Willingness to Pay?, 28 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3212, 3212 (2010) (stating
that 62% of personal bankruptcies are estimated to be a result of medical expenses).
60. See Pisu et al., supra note 58, at 1262.
61. Guy et al., supra note 51, at 3754.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Walid F. Gellad, Center for Health Equity Research and Promotion, Targeted Cancer
Therapy: From Bench to Bedside to Patient, 32 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 268, 268 (2014).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ann H. Partridge et al., Adherence to Therapy with Oral Antineoplastic Agents, 94 J.
NAT’L CANCER INST. 652, 659 (2002).
68. Theodore Darkow et al., Treatment Interruptions and Non-Adherence with Imatinib and
Associated Healthcare Costs, 25 PHARMACOECONOMICS 481, 483 (2007) (citing a study that
documented a low rate of medication adherence in individuals despite infection of HIV).
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illustrate the need for strict adherence, one study documented that even a
low rate of nonadherence of 85% was associated with the medication
failure and spawning of cellular cancer clones.69 Nonadherence is
increasingly becoming a problem for patients suffering from cancer
because traditionally, anticancer therapies have been administered in
hospitals and physicians’ offices which led to health care providers
ensuring a full chemotherapy regime.70 However, a growing number of
anticancer therapies are administered orally, outside the formal health
care setting, and therefore depend on the patient’s rate of medication
adherence.71
Further, anxiety over the cost of receiving treatment is not relegated
to the traditionally poor patient.72 Rather, one study found that the direct
and indirect costs of care were factors that were considered by a wide
swath of privately insured patients, regardless of income.73 Accordingly,
the financial costs associated with immediate and long-term cancer care
should be more of a factor in determining cancer treatment and health
policy, especially in decisions that affect individuals in a lower SES.74
One of the most significant factors driving a higher cost of care is the
cost of cancer drugs. The price of pharmaceuticals in the United States is
markedly higher than the price of the same pharmaceuticals in similar
nations.75 The cost of drugs associated with cancer care is growing at a
rate of 15%—twice the rate of the overall market.76 As of 2010, there
were at least 100 new molecules for cancer treatment in phase III trials;
however, there was no indication that any of these drugs would lead to
cheaper alternatives to the currently available cancer drugs.77 In the
United States, the average for a single patient’s annual cost of cancer
drugs ballooned from the $5,000 to $10,000 range to more than $100,000
in less than fifteen years.78 However, the price of cancer drugs is not the
only concerning factor in providing care to the terminally ill. Cancer69. Stacie B. Dusetzina et al., Cost Sharing and Adherence to Tyrosine Kinase Inhibitors
for Patients with Chronic Myeloid Leukemia, 32 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 306, 309 (2014).
70. Id. at 310.
71. Id. at 309–10.
72. See Tammy K. Stump et al., Cost Concerns of Patients with Cancer, 9 J. ONCOLOGY
PRAC. 251, 253 (2013) (stating that cost concerns exist outside the traditionally “vulnerable”
patient group).
73. See id. at 254 (stating that a low SES was not a reliable measure to determine a patient’s
concern over cost of care).
74. See Pisu et al., supra note 58, at 1263.
75. Squires & Anderson, supra note 54, at 5 (citing a study that found a 50% lower price
for pharmaceuticals in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom compared to the United
States).
76. Schickedanz, supra note 37, at 74.
77. Id.
78. Kantarjian & Rajkumar, supra note 3.
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specific spending has doubled in the past twenty years, a larger increase
than general medical spending as a whole.79 For instance, in 1987 the
total medical cost of cancer was $24.7 billion, adjusted for inflation as of
2007.80 From 1987 to 2001 through 2005, the medical cost of cancer
increased 98% to $48.1 billion.81 Although there is a downward trend in
cancer occurrence, cancer spending has increased due to an aging
population that is living longer due to medical advancements that prolong
life.82 Simple changes have helped push against the rise in the cost of
cancer care such as providing chemotherapy and radiation treatment in
an outpatient setting; however, these changes are unable to combat the
rising cost associated with a larger population of those ailing from
cancer.83 So who is footing the bill for this care?
As already the biggest bearer of costs, private insurers’ burden has
swelled to over half of all cancer-caused medical expenditures.84 One
study found that of the recently diagnosed cancer survivors aged 18 to
64, private insurers pay for nearly 70% of medical expenditures.85 One
aspect that contributes to the increase in size of private insurers’ burden
is the implementation of early screening efforts in younger generations.86
While the population served by Medicaid is small, its share of the cost
experienced the largest relative increase, likely attributable to paying for
care associated with cancers that were detected at a late stage.87
In order to combat the rising costs of cancer, many medical costs and
expenses are being shifted from insurers to patients through higher
premiums and higher deductibles.88 The cost shift to higher premiums
and deductibles puts cancer survivors who are of working age at a serious
threat of financial hardship, with one study reporting one in four having
experienced financial hardship due to the cost of medical expenditure.89
The exposure to higher financial insecurity will only increase with the
higher cost of care—seemingly forcing patients to continue to elect for
higher deductible plans in order to manage some costs.90
79. Tangka et al., supra note 53, at 3482.
80. Id. at 3479.
81. Id. at 3479–80.
82. Id. at 3482.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Guy et al., supra note 51, at 3754.
86. Tangka et al., supra note 53, at 3483.
87. Id.
88. K. Robin Yabroff et al., Financial Hardship Associated with Cancer in the United
States: Findings from a Population-Based Sample of Adult Cancer Survivors, 34 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 259, 265 (2016).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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What is the real-world response to the higher costs? “[E]vidence
suggests that cancer survivors with financial hardship or higher out-ofpocket costs are more likely to delay or forgo general medical care and
cancer care and have poorer adherence to cancer treatment, compared
with those without financial hardship or lower out-of-pocket costs.”91
One national study estimated two million cancer survivors did not seek
required medical services because of cost.92 Furthermore, cancer
survivors who experience financial hardship are also more likely to report
poor quality of life.93
The cost of cancer is often studied in terms of medical costs; however,
“the true burden of cancer includes nonmedical costs for travel and child
care, costs incurred by caretakers, and nontangible costs associated with
psychological pain and stress, as well as loss of productivity.”94 One
study reported one in four cancer survivors have experienced
psychological hardship in response to the financial difficulty in paying
for care.95 A cancer diagnosis can interrupt employment and “have
negative consequences on earnings, career development, retirement
decisions, and a personal sense of self-efficacy.”96 This is of concern
because employer-provided health insurance is the main source of
insurance among working-age individuals and “employment disruption
or limitations in the ability to work may reduce access to insurance, and
when combined with reduced earnings, may increase the risk of material
and psychological financial hardship.”97
D. Changes to Health Care
The high cost of cancer care is receiving increasing attention.98 For
instance, one study suggests that future efforts to change health care could
include consumer-driven health care options, such as Health Savings
Accounts and High-Deductible Health Plans that would increase a
patient’s options while also increasing the burden of care the patient
would have to pay in the form of out-of-pocket expenses.99 The inevitable
rise of the cost of cancer care and the shifting burdens for the associated

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Yabroff, supra note 48, at 2012.
Id.
Tangka et al., supra note 53, at 3483.
Yabroff et al., supra note 88, at 263–64.
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id.
Tangka et al., supra note 53, at 3483.
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costs100 present a bleak, yet crucial question that must be confronted by
every person diagnosed with cancer: At what cost?
One cannot accurately respond to that question without understanding
the inefficiencies present in the health care market. In an efficient market,
consumers’ willingness to pay conveys the value consumers place on a
given product and signals the proper supply levels to producers.101
However, the U.S. health care system is far from a picture of efficiency.
As a general concept, utilization of health insurance skews the incentivebased structure of an efficiently operating market to favor
overconsumption as patients are no longer bearing the full cost of the
product.102 One suggested change to the insurance structure is to create a
more accurate cost-sharing scheme that is based not on cost but value.103
A value-based scheme could lower the copay for high-value products and
services to encourage use while simultaneously increasing the amount
patients would have to pay to utilize low-value services.104 A shift
towards a value-based approach is likely to help stem the rising cost of
care while simultaneously providing patients with care options that best
reflect their desires and provide outcomes that are accurately reflected in
their pretreatment decision-making analysis.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act105 (ACA) has been
the most expansive and wide-reaching overhaul of the health care
industry in the United States since the passage of Medicare and
Medicaid.106 However, despite its passage, health care costs have
continued to rise, albeit it at a slower rate due to the ACA
implementation.107 Pursuant to the passage of the ACA, many sectors of
the health care industry have been affected by new regulation, including
health insurance providers. However, while the ACA is a solid point from
which discussion regarding improving the current state of the market can
begin, it is by no means a final solution to the inefficiencies of the U.S.
health care system.108

100. See id.
101. Schickedanz, supra note 37, at 74.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
106. Frederic E. Shaw et al., The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Opportunities
for Prevention and Public Health, 384 LANCET 75, 75 (2014).
107. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, MEDICAL COST TREND: BEHIND THE NUMBERS 2017,
at 2 (2016) (predicting a 6.5% increase in health care in 2017).
108. See Heidi W. Albright et al., The Implications of the 2010 Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act on Cancer Care
Delivery, 117 CANCER 1564, 1564 (2011).
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Society is experiencing an awakening. The creation of the internet
helped usher in a new perspective on life across the globe. Alternative
medicine is gaining recognition, new lifestyles are being adopted, and
many individuals in western culture are turning to what was once written
off as “eastern medicine.” The public’s perception of “health” is
undergoing rapid and radical change.
II. CASH ME OUTSIDE
A need for a change to health care delivery is evident. Too often the
choice of whether to receive additional medical treatment is inherently
biased in that additional medical intervention is the default—the vantage
point from which patients determine treatment plans—rather than
viewing additional medical intervention merely as an option among
several alternatives. While open communication within a physician–
patient relationship is crucial to a patient’s ultimate decision, a doctor’s
own discomfort over a patient’s decision to “do nothing” undoubtedly
influences the decision-making process. Emerging medical technology
unquestionably allows humans to live longer and certainly in most cases,
much better; however, although technology allows patients to reap a
longer lifespan, living longer is not necessarily the best plan for every
patient suffering from a terminal cancer. Giving patients a right to choose
what seems like a radical, fringe possibility is a tenet in patient autonomy
that balances the costs and benefits of end-of-life care.
At first glance, the cash-back incentive provision would certainly
offend society’s conscience by seeming to put a price on a patient’s life,
similar to the death panel discussion that has followed for years after the
passage of the ACA.109 Further, a contractual provision like this would
surely come under fire for being offensive to public policy and would be
challenged as unenforceable in the courts.110 However, as this Note
explains, unsavory contractual terms that are entered into freely by two
independent agents should not be stricken as unenforceable merely over
the public’s shock of such blunt provisions.111 This Part explores the
possible hang-ups the cash-rebate provision would likely confront and
distinguishes similar, yet different analogies that would likely be made in
109. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Why Talk of Non-Existent Obamacare Death Panels Won’t Die,
WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/09/whytalk-of-non-existent-obamacare-death-panels-wont-die/?utm_term=.a78adafe6b5f (documenting
the public outrage that followed Sarah Palin’s Facebook post that criticized the Affordable Care
Act’s “death panels” that turned out to be nonexistent).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
111. See id. ch. 8, intro. note (stating that the principle of freedom to contract is in the public’s
best interest to have broad powers in determining terms of an agreement that are reached as a
result of a bargain).
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comparison to the provision. This Part concludes with legislative
suggestions that would take the provision from mere proposition to viable
alternative option for patients.
A. Unenforceability on Grounds of Public Policy
The predominant hurdle this idea would likely confront is the
contention that the agreement between the insurer and patient would be
unenforceable as it seemingly violates public policy. Fundamental to all
contract law is the principal of an individual’s freedom to contract.112
However, while an individual is free to contract, a validly formed contract
may nevertheless be held unenforceable for public policy concerns.113
Contract law holds that an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if either legislation provides for such unenforceability or
“the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances
by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”114 Essentially,
“the need to protect public policy must outweigh the enforcement of the
contract.”115
The Restatement of Contracts (Second) provides for a cost–benefit
approach to determine whether an agreement is offensive to the public.116
The modern view put forth by the Restatement utilizes a fact-specific
analysis to determine whether an agreement is offensive to public
policy.117 Courts have acknowledged this approach in striking down
consensual agreements on grounds of public policy concerns.118
Accordingly, this fact-specific analysis has produced a wide range of
agreements that, while not illegal to perform per se, have been held
unenforceable.119 Accordingly, the characterization of these agreements
bears little significance and one cannot rely solely upon these
distinctions.120
When undergoing the cost–benefit analysis proposed by the
Restatement, the “court may consider the strength of the policy through
legislation or case law, the likelihood that rendering the term or contract
112. Andrea E. White, The Nature of Taboo Contracts: A Legal Analysis of BDSM Contracts
and Specific Performance, 84 UMKC L. REV. 1163, 1173 (2016).
113. Id.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
115. White, supra note 112, at 1173.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
117. See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 12:1 (4th ed.).
118. See, e.g., Sw. Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 421 (1959)
(acknowledging the importance of insight into the factual circumstances when striking contracts
as void for public policy).
119. See 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 117, § 12:1.
120. See id.
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unenforceable will advance the policy, the amount of misconduct, and the
relationship between any misconduct and the contract terms.”121 While
determining public policy usually boils down to a benefit analysis, courts
have also used long-standing precedent to determine what is offensive to
the general public.122 “Our society prohibits, and all human societies have
prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but because
they are considered, in the traditional phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e.,
immoral. In American society, such prohibitions have included, for
example, sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use,
prostitution, and sodomy.”123
However, what is important to note in considering sound public policy
is the fluctuating and variable nature amid fluctuating circumstances and
changing public opinion. For instance, pursuant to a shift in public
opinion, sodomy is no longer against public policy due to the Court’s
ruling in Lawrence v. Texas.124 It is difficult to draw clear distinctions to
determine what provisions offend public policy, outside of a statutorydriven background.125
Enforcement of binding contract provisions maximizes social welfare
because it allows for cooperation between parties in otherwise impossible
circumstances.126 A fundamental understanding in contract theory is that
all effects and costs associated with the contract are borne by the
contracting parties; however, if the contract produces negative
externalities, the contract is unlikely to maximize social welfare.127 To
deter contracts that produce harmful effects on third parties, society could
subject the contracting parties to criminal or civil liability128 or the court
could refuse enforcement of contracts as offensive to society, thereby
setting a precedent in the market.129 Thus, from an economic perspective,
determining whether a contract offends public policy focuses on
“determinations of negative externalities and, after such determinations,
121. White, supra note 112, at 1173.
122. See Roe v. Butterworth, 958 F. Supp. 1569, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (quoting Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 574–75, (1991)).
123. Id.
124. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
125. David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 563, 612 (2012) (showing a higher success rate with an unenforceable defense with
matters that have roots in statutory prohibition rather than a broad public policy-based approach).
126. See Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2006) (highlighting possible examples of outcomes in a system that lacks an
enforcement mechanism, namely misappropriation of prepaid funds and incentive to renegotiate
terms upon reliance by the other contracting party).
127. See id. at 1446–47.
128. See id. at 1447. While holding the parties liable could be possible, it is not a feasible
solution as the cost of monitoring, litigating, and enforcement would deter such action. Id.
129. See id.
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on whether enforcement would lead to an increase in net social
welfare.”130 Thus, when considering the proposition, courts should take
into account the entire effect of the agreement between the insurer and
insured and the role this relationship has on the general public and the
health care market as a whole.
B. Lack of Legislative Prohibition
Unlike many other agreements that have been held unenforceable, a
cash-rebate incentive to forgo end-of-life care has not been addressed by
any legislative body nor has any court confronted the idea. Various
unsavory contractual agreements, however, have been addressed and
prohibited by legislation. For instance, a similar, yet distinguishable
analogy to the cash-rebate proposal is the concept of a free market to
procure human organs, a proposal that has long been explicitly prohibited
by federal law.131 Contrary to the current proposition, the prohibition of
organ sales, while similarly distasteful, was passed not merely because it
is a distasteful term but rather for sound policy considerations. Generally,
“the public policy defense is more often successfully invoked and
resolved in the most ‘ruly’ manner when it is closely linked to a statute
or promulgated regulation than when it is not.”132
C. The Sale of Human Organs
Similar to the cash-rebate incentive, the sale of human organs raises a
similar public unrest due to an “objectification of the human body.”133
While many people elect to become organ donors via state driver’s
licenses, the sale of such organs is prohibited.134 The National Organ
Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) was passed by lawmakers to specifically
prohibit the sale of organs for “valuable consideration.”135 Subsequent to
NOTA’s passage and numerous court rulings, society has remained in a
constant battle in attempting to balance the dignity of the human body
with saving lives.136 A cash rebate for forgoing end-of-life care would
seemingly fall into similar public distaste due to a feeling of objectifying
the human body and stripping away the sanctity of human life to merely
dollars and cents in order to maximize corporate profit. Despite a
130. See id. at 1448.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”).
132. Friedman, supra note 125, at 601.
133. White, supra note 112, at 1179.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

464

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

prohibition against organ sales, many people feel that if the donor
consents to a transplant after being fully informed, then the donor should
be able to go through with the transaction, thereby promoting an
individual’s freedom to contract.137 The same can be said for a cashrebate proposal. While a contract dealing with altering the end of life may
be disliked by the public, there will undoubtedly be a segment of society
that rejects the paternalistic ideology over end-of-life care in favor of a
patient’s right to self-determination, albeit tainted with a cash incentive.
1. Unduly Coercive
However, a portion of society also feels that a market to sell organs
would be unduly coercive to low-income individuals and would lead to
exploitation, undoubtedly another possible hurdle that a cash-rebate
incentive program would face.138 This is an extreme view that implies
that the poor will act as martyrs to a system that monetarily rewards selfsacrifice in an effort to minimize health care expenditure.139 However, it
ignores the reality that the exchange is not coercive, but rather a voluntary
exchange—freely trading an organ for a financial gain.140 “Offering an
individual compensation to donate an organ is ‘no more coercive than
paying a coal miner to work in [a] mine, a professor to teach, or a surgeon
to provide medical services.’”141 Prices are not a form of undue coercion,
but rather a “reward for our efforts” for making an informed decision to
abstain from care that provides minimal benefit for a great cost—a sound,
rational economic judgment.142 The inducement to forgo care would only
be the price, a present cash value of the cost of what heroic measures
would cost.
Additionally, an ironic and counterproductive outcome would result
from a prohibition of these agreements on a policy basis to protect the
poor.143 Prohibiting a cash payment for abstaining from wasteful health
care spending would only exacerbate the individual’s poverty and

137. Michelle Castillo, Ethical Dilemmas Surround Those Willing to Sell, Buy Kidneys on
Black Market, CBS NEWS (Jan. 7, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ethicaldilemmas-surround-those-willing-to-sell-buy-kidneys-on-black-market/.
138. See id.; see also Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The FDA Burdens
Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 242 (2007) (citing a cash-based incentive
program to reduce unwanted pregnancies that did not face any legal challenges).
139. See Cody Corely, Money as a Motivator: The Cure to Our Nation’s Organ Shortage,
11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 106 (2011).
140. See T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, On the Ethics of Paying Organ Donors:
An Economics Perspective, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 827, 832 (2006).
141. Corely, supra note 139, at 106–07.
142. See Beard & Kaserman, supra note 140, at 832, 836.
143. See id.
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perpetuate an inefficient market that rewards health care providers at the
expense of individuals’ right to freedom to contract.144
2. The Objectification of the Body
Another similar argument that is often brought up to support the
prohibition of organ sales is the idea that the body is being stripped down
to merely a commodity and reduces the sanctity of life. It has been warned
that a purely economic approach to organ sales would possibly lead to an
“ultimate slide down the slippery slope.”145 Here, however, a cash
incentive is markedly different from a sale of an organ. In the sale, one
must actively be a participant in a transaction. Such action requires a
higher level of thought and participation. Compare that to a cash incentive
program that merely offers patients the opportunity to be rewarded for
their decision to “do nothing” in the market, the more efficient decision.
It is the difference between actively seeking out an unsavory transaction
and merely making a responsible decision that would empower autonomy
and a patient’s right to health care determination—action that should be
prohibited as a violation of public policy. It is not an objectification of
the human body, but rather an acknowledgment and promotion of the
right to determine one’s future.
D. Surrogacy Contracts
As a result of emerging technologies, couples previously unable to
have children outside of adoption can resort to an alternative to satisfy
the desire to have closer biological ties with their offspring—
surrogacy.146 “The typical surrogacy arrangement involves an agreement,
usually by contract, for the surrogate to be artificially inseminated with
the semen of the husband of the infertile couple, to carry the fetus to term,
and to relinquish parental rights upon birth.”147 In the landmark case In
re Baby M.,148 the New Jersey Superior Court’s Chancery Division
recognized the right to enter into surrogacy contracts, but struck down the
contract as unenforceable for public policy concerns.149 Since the
inception of this alternative to child rearing, concerns of dehumanization,
exploitation, and black-market babies have been raised.150 The “common

144. See id. at 832–33.
145. Corely, supra note 139, at 110.
146. Steven M. Recht, Note, ‘M’ is for Money: Baby M and the Surrogate Motherhood
Controversy, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1013, 1017 (1988).
147. Id. at 1019.
148. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987).
149. Recht, supra note 146, at 1038–39.
150. Id. at 1020.
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denominator” for these concerns is money.151 Subsequently, despite a
freedom to contract,152 surrogacy contracts are struck down because of
legislation that prohibits the exchange of consideration in connection
with adoption.153 However, with the proposition at hand, there is no
prohibition for a cash incentive payment unlike that of surrogacy
contracts. Again, courts are unlikely to strike down contracts merely
because they seem offensive without any link to statutory precedent.154
E. Viatical Settlements
The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic of the
1980s and 1990s was one of the most destructive times in modern health
history.155 Not only was the epidemic tragic from a human health
perspective, the outbreak was wrought with legal issues ranging from
employment discrimination to the patients’ rights to publicly funded
treatments.156 However, one of the most consequential results from the
epidemic was the public’s acknowledgment of the “gravity of the United
States health care crisis, as society [witnessed an] . . . increasing
population of terminally ill individuals struggling bitterly to secure
finances for medical treatment.”157 As a result of the dire financial straits
in which many terminally ill patients found themselves, a new financial
tool emerged—the viatical settlement.158 The market for viatical
settlements emerged to allow terminally ill individuals an opportunity to
receive an immediate cash payout by selling their insurance policies for
a discounted price of the full value.159 Generally, a viatical settlement is
a sale of a life insurance policy to a third party. 160 More specifically, a
terminally ill person will sell his or her life insurance policy to a third
party for an immediate cash settlement.161 The patient is usually paid
anywhere from 50% to 80% of the policy’s full value, depending on the

151. Id. at 1026.
152. Id. at 1020.
153. Id. at 1026.
154. See Friedman, supra note 125, at 601.
155. Lee Ann Dean, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Viatical Settlement, and the
Health Care Crisis: Aids Patients Reach into the Future to Make Ends Meet, 25 RUTGERS L.J.
117, 117 (1993).
156. Id. at 118–19.
157. Id. at 120.
158. Id. at 121.
159. Jennifer Berner, Note, Beating the Grim Reaper, or Just Confusing Him? Examining
the Harmful Effects of Viatical Settlement Regulation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 581, 583–84
(1994).
160. Dean, supra note 155, at 121 n.17.
161. Berner, supra note 159, at 584.
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patient’s life expectancy.162 The company is then paid upon the
assignor’s death.163 Specifically, the contract that governs the agreement
is a product of negotiation between the patient and the third party that
eventually results in a mutually agreeable price and assignment of the
policy from the patient to the third party.164 The central argument in
challenging viatical settlements, which is analogous to the argument
against a cash rebate to forgo end-of-life care, is “whether an individual’s
right to use his property to secure life-sustaining treatment outweighs a
state’s historical and fundamental interest in preserving the ‘sanctity of
life.’”165 One argument in support of the viatical-settlement market states
that loss of employment and associated financial hardship imposed by the
high cost of care for AIDS treatment creates a compelling interest in those
who want to sell their life insurance policies, “one that outweighs moral
objections to the process.”166 The cost of cancer care has since been on
the rise and is predicted to continue,167 furthering the proposition that the
true cost of cancer care should be balanced against the moral objections
to the process.168 Similar to the acquiescence to the advent of a viaticalsettlement market, a cash-rebate incentive for the terminally ill should be
permitted in order to help those individuals find peace of mind and
financial security169 and even realize lifelong and unaffordable dreams.170
F. Proposed Legislation
As a practical matter, while there lacks any prohibition against the
policy, legislation authorizing such incentive provisions in insurance
premiums would be highly preferred. Not only would legislation
regulating the market serve to establish an efficient market, legislation
could provide transparency to alleviate any public concern and provide
for clear and transparent regulation. The public concern over a cashrebate incentive payment would likely be fueled by the risk of
overreaching and undue influence upon vulnerable victims.171 Similar
concerns were brought up in opposition to the viatical-settlement
market.172 However, in response to those concerns, legislatures
162. Id.
163. Dean, supra note 155, at 121.
164. Id. at 135–36.
165. Id. at 141.
166. Id.
167. See Mariotto et al., supra note 24, at 124.
168. Dean, supra note 155, at 141.
169. Berner, supra note 159, at 585–86.
170. Kara Swisher, Allstate to Offer Discounts to Buy Policies of the Terminally Ill, WASH.
POST, Aug. 1, 1991, at B8.
171. Berner, supra note 159, at 586.
172. Id.
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throughout the United States drafted laws to regulate the industry.173
Viatical settlements came under the control of state insurance
commissioners or administrators.174 Similarly, a centralized state
overseer would help keep public concern over cash-rebate fraud at bay.
Various requirements contained in legislation regulating viatical
settlements could similarly serve to protect patients in a cash-rebate
incentive program. For instance, a purchaser entering into a viatical
settlement must obtain a written statement from a medical professional
affirming the seller is not acting under undue influence.175 Like the seller
in a viatical settlement, a patient who decides to forgo care can be
required to get written consent from an independent third-party medical
professional to assure the patient is not being subject to any undue
influence or coercion. Additionally, like viatical-settlement regulation,
regulation with cash incentives could require additional counseling by
medical professionals so the patient understands the illness, the benefits
of receiving care, and the terms of the settlement.176
CONCLUSION
In a time of massive political discord in the United States, sweeping
change could eventually come in the form of repeal of the status quo and
a possible establishment of a new scheme.177 A cash-rebate incentive
provision would be one of many changes to U.S. health care that could
provide lower costs to both insurers and patients. A cash-rebate provision
should not be prohibited as unenforceable contracts under the guise of
protecting the public. A cash-rebate provision serves to reduce the high
cost of care and more closely align the true cost of care with the benefits
received and a patient’s genuine desire. Ultimately, it would help cut the
cost of wasteful cancer spending that is unlikely to result in beneficial
outcomes.178

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 588.
176. See id.
177. See Mike DeBonis, Anxious Lawmakers to GOP Leaders: What’s the Plan to Replace
Obamacare?, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/anxiouslawmakers-to-gop-leaders-whats-the-plan-to-replace-obamacare/2017/01/12/bdbea6bc-d8e111e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.5261a9ce8f7d.
178. See Earle et al., supra note 41, at 3952.
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